Abstract. Through the Nuclear Liabilities Management Authority White Paper, the UK Government and the Regulators have signalled a commitment to further improving the operation of the regulatory regime and to its operating within the principles of proportionality, transparency, consistency and accountability which underpin the Government's approach to regulation in general. Particular emphasis is placed upon ensuring that there is greater consistency in the treatment of risk and hazard; proportionate and cost effective delivery of public, worker and environmental protection and an open and transparently applied regulatory system. The paper uses the historical record of radioactive discharges from BNFL's Sellafield reprocessing site in the UK and seeks to identify what have been the key drivers for change, particularly over the past 20 years of significant discharge reductions. The paper examines the current context for ongoing and future discharges from the site, and the incorporation of the use of the concepts of Best Practicable Environmental Option and Best Practicable Means. Intergovernmental commitments such as the OSPAR Sintra and Bremen statements and the developing UK policy framework are also considered, together with BNFL's work with a wide range of 'green' stakeholders. The paper outlines the principal components of BNFL's decision-making processes for discharge control and abatement; and how these interact with the relevant external pressures. It then analyses whether the overall drivers and outcomes align with the declared desire of the UK government to ensure that the taxpayer receives value for money in the new national arrangements for managing historic nuclear liabilities.
Introduction
The risks of radiation are relatively well known and doses to the public arising from radioactive discharges from nuclear installations are now very low indeed. Even to those few people who receive the highest doses (the so-called "critical group") around a site like Sellafield, the individual risk of developing a cancer from exposure to present discharges is only a little over 1 in a million per annum. Major discharge reduction projects (the Enhanced Actinide Removal Plant -EARP, the Sellafield Ion exchange Effluent Plant -SIXEP, and the Salt Evaporator) alone cost in total about £750 Million, and over the last two decades peak doses have reduced by more than an order of magnitude. Graphs showing reduction in the activity of discharges at Sellafield are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. However, there is still strong political and social pressure for discharges and associated doses/risks to be further reduced. This issue also raises some interesting wider questions. The pressures may partly arise because radiation risk is poorly understood by the public and media, partly because there is not always an appreciation that using resources to reduce one risk, may preclude another, greater risk being addressed. An example of this is the desire for continuous and progressive reductions in discharges, which entails a very low risk, would delay the reduction of a much more significant risk (hazard) afforded by clean up and remediation activities at Sellafield. Environmental discharges is an emotive subject and clearly, the decision making process must go beyond science and economics. The key issue therefore is how the concerns and perceptions of stakeholders can be factored into the decision making process. If the course of action indicated by technical/ economic analysis is not to be followed, this must be done clearly and transparently with clarity about the implications for priorities in the use of resources to reduce risk.
FIG. 1. Sellafield Alpha Liquid Discharges (TBq)
In this paper we look at the scientific nature of the risks and how these might be better presented. We also show the stark choices which exist for the best allocation of resources to reduce risk and finally, confront the difficult and complex issue of how less quantifiable "socio-political" issues might fairly and transparently be included in the final decision-making process.
The Risks Arising From Exposure to Radiation
The International Commission for Radiological Protection (1) has estimated the risk of death from exposure to radiation to be 5 x 10 -2 per Sievert for a general population and 4 x 10 -2 per Sievert for a working population; the difference reflecting the different age structures of the populations (ICRP, 1990) . It uses the cautious assumption that any radiation dose, no matter how small, carries with it some risk of detriment to health (the so-called, Linear No-Threshold model of radiation risks). On this model naturally occurring background radiation (~ 2mSv) presents a risk to every individual of eventual death from exposure of about 1 in 10 4 p.a.
Contrary to public perception, radiation is a relatively weak carcinogen. One way of putting this into perspective is to estimate the consequence of exposing (say) 20,000 people to a dose of 1mSv (the dose limit for the public and roughly 10 times higher than the exposure of the Sellafield critical group). On the basis of current risk estimates and using the concept of collective dose of which the limitations, which is discussed below, about one extra cancer death would be anticipated eventually to occur in that population. This would be indistinguishable from the 4000-5000 other cancer deaths, which would occur "naturally" over the remaining lifetime of the exposed persons.
However, this assumption of a linear, no threshold dose-response relationship has a further consequence, which can lead to public concern if the results are not put carefully into perspective. The concept of the collective dose (such as in the example above based on a 1mSv dose) has led to major misconceptions about the risk of radiation. Minute doses to enormous populations summed over long periods of time have led to accuzations that many deaths will arise from the radioactive discharges of the nuclear industry but the conservative basis for these assumptions (which are peculiar to radioactivity because of our knowledge of it and ability to measure it) are rarely put into perspective. This argument would lead, for example, to the conclusion that the exposure of the world population to medical radiation (~1.8M Man Sv) leads to about 90,000 deaths every year and that exposure of the world's population to the natural background (~13M Man Sv) leads to about 650,000 deaths.
Collective dose can be a useful concept when applied in context, but presenting the summed effects of minute doses is an example of uncritical use, which leads to conclusions, which are at best counterintuitive. In section 4 of this paper we will be suggesting ways in which the concept of collective dose might be used more critically.
The scientifically-based conclusions are therefore that:
• We have a relatively good knowledge of the risks of exposure to radiation. It is a relatively weak carcinogen, and detecting its effects even at high levels of exposure is a difficult task.
• Doses for members of the public from nuclear power operations are small compared with naturally occurring radiation doses received by us all.
• Risks of exposure to these very low doses are estimated conservatively. Concepts (peculiar to radiation exposure) such as collective dose are employed to estimate potential effects, again on a conservative basis. Great care, however, must be exercised to avoid their uncritical use.
• Annual risks to the handful of people comprising the critical group, even at a site such as Sellafield, where historic discharges were relatively high by today's standards and the effects of these comprise a large contribution to the total dose, are a few parts per million. The dose to others declines progressively with distance, and is typically orders of magnitude lower.
• In scientific terms, it can be concluded that we are dealing with very small risks from a relatively well understood, easily measured and very strictly controlled carcinogen.
Costs, benefits and socio-political influences on decision-making.
Reduction of discharges from BNFL's reprocessing plant at Sellafield will be taken as an example of some of the issues in this section of the paper. It is perhaps an extreme example, but nonetheless illustrates well some of the points being made in this paper which will almost certainly have applicability to other sites and to other countries.
The dose to the critical group from Sellafield discharges is about 0.1 mSv. However, there are still strong political and social pressures for discharges and doses to be reduced further. There is a particular concern from neighbouring states that Sellafield discharges may lead to a loss of confidence in their fishing industries and suggestions that even the minute doses received by their populations may lead to ill-health. A substantial pressure for further reductions arises from the OSPAR Convention to which the UK is a contracting party. This deals generally with reducing pollution to the North Atlantic and, inter alia, requires that "by the year 2020, the OSPAR Commission will ensure that discharges, emissions and losses of radioactive substances are reduced to levels where the additional concentrations in the marine environment above historic levels, resulting from such discharges, emissions and losses, are close to zero".
In accordance with the programme of work agreed by OSPAR, the UK Government has published a National Discharge Strategy, to show how the UK intends to meet its commitments. Since the UK made its commitment to OSPAR, BNFL has announced programmes of early closures of Magnox reactor plant and its associated reprocessing facilities plant which are likely to reduce critical group doses from current operations at Sellafield (excluding decommissioning) to about 0.03 mSv p.a. by 2020. The UK Strategy states an intention to use best practicable means to achieve critical group doses of 0.02 mSv or below. Although programmes for closure have been influenced by a variety of factors, meeting OSPAR commitments has been a significant consideration. The total cost of these early closures has been estimated to be in excess of £750 M in direct costs, with even greater longer-term indirect costs arising from unemployment and impacts on the local economies in remote regions. Furthermore, replacement fossil generation will lead to higher carbon emissions.
Based purely on a scientific and economic evaluation of the facts, it is difficult to see how these further reductions can be justified. Application of the ALARA principle requires that radiological doses and risks should be reduced to a level that represents a balance between radiological and other factors, including social and economic factors. A widely used method of balancing reduction in detriment against the cost of a scheme to reduce discharges is to apply a value to the reduction in collective dose. It is clear that purely in terms of collective dose saved versus cost, almost all schemes would not proceed.
It can be argued with some justification that the requirement to implement schemes to reduce discharges are driven more strongly by considerations of critical group savings than of collective dose. The reductions achieved in critical group dose in the past two decades has been more than an order of magnitude, from around 2 mSv to around 0.1 mSv. There is no accepted quantifiable link between critical group saving and cost. However, it can be seen that to achieve a typical reduction in risk to the most exposed people of less than 1 in a million p.a. can have significant resource costs.
There are other partially quantifiable technical factors which may need to be considered and "tradedoff" in achieving a proportionate approach. For example, reducing public dose may be achieved at the expense of increasing dose to workers, reducing nuclear safety levels or incurring other detriments to the environment either by discharging non-radioactive material as part of the process to reduce dose or through the impact (eg CO 2 emissions) of alternative electricity generation. At present there is rarely much of an attempt made to balance these factors in the UK, at least. Furthermore, such "balancing" is made more difficult because regulatory requirements operate to different criteria. This has the consequence that resources can be applied preferentially to one area rather than the other with little rationale basis in terms of the risks being reduced. This is clearly a matter of public preference, but it is vital that it is made as a result of careful consideration rather than as a result of failure of "joined up" thinking. Figure 3 illustrates the process which actually now seems to be occurring in decision-making on discharge reductions in the UK. The first box shows the broadly accepted basis for carrying out costbenefit analysis based on collective dose. This however, seldom seems to be accepted as a reliable indication of "acceptability". The second box in the figure represents arguments based on critical group dose. Although there is no accepted valuation to be placed on reducing a microSievert of critical group dose, the indication is that the costs per microSievert saved (i.e. cost per individual risk reduced) are very high. The right-hand box in Figure 3 is intended to illustrate that the argument has now increasingly moved on to issues relating to the number of Bequerels released, irrespective of cost benefit considerations or estimates of harm based on concepts of dose.
FIG.3. Discharges -Decision Framework
This perhaps reflects the fact that far less quantifiable issues are now taking centre stage in decisionmaking about whether or not to spend resources to reduce radioactive discharges. They include perceptions that radioactivity is in some way uniquely dangerous and insidious, views that no level of radioactive pollutant in the environment is acceptable, and concerns that, whatever the scientific evidence, discharges may impact on other legitimate uses of the environment. These are, in most cases, genuinely and strongly held views, which deserve to be taken seriously into account in any debate. However, it is important that they are considered alongside the technical and economic arguments in a transparent way so that their full implications in decision-making can be assessed.
Dealing with the collective dose issue
One way in which the concept of collective dose might be made clearer and more useful would be to present contributions to collective dose in appropriate bands. It is immediately apparent that the major contribution arises from very small doses, summed over large populations for long periods of time.
Jackson et al (2) have proposed that a risk related value of spend for saving a statistical life (VSSSL) is used for cost-benefit studies across the power generation sector, and the nuclear industry in particular. An upper bound on VSSSL is set based on the observation that excessive spend (probably of the order of more than £5M per statistical life) will actually cost lives. Above a risk of 10 -3 per annum it is assumed that VSSSL approaches this maximum sustainable value, whereas below a risk of 10 -9 per annum the value of further risk reduction approaches zero. At risks around 10 -6 per annum it is proposed that an appropriate VSSSL lies in the range £0.25M to £1M.
With respect to radiological protection, it is suggested that where collective doses are dominated by average individual doses no more than a few tens of µSv, the detriment arising from a manSv can be 
Socio-political factors -getting transparency in the debate
One important implication is that the consideration of such "social" and "political" factors and a responding to public perceptions will lead to more resources being spent to prevent a statistical fatality (or other consequence of a reducing risk) in one area rather than in another. From UK experience, the implied values to prevent a fatality, or VSSSL are:
• Health Service << £1M • Roads < £1M
• Railways a few £M • Radiological £ 10s-100s M.
The baseline UK Government figure for the value of a fatality prevented is about £1M. This is used, for example, to determine investments in road improvement schemes as a contribution to reducing the several thousand fatalities on UK roads each year. Significantly lower sums would save real lives in the health sector in the UK through the increased provision of hospital beds or better treatment of life threatening medical conditions. Interestingly, use of the same radiological protection criteria as those discussed above would imply that a significant number of statistical lives would be saved by expending resources on improved radiation controls and new radiological equipment in the health sector.
The position is not peculiar to the UK. More detailed studies in the USA (3) and in Sweden (4) for example, have exposed the issue even more clearly by looking at a wide range of life-saving interventions. The actual implied value of a statistical life from actual regulatory/societal decisions varies over several orders of magnitude.
So long as these variations in expenditure genuinely reflect public priorities, it is quite reasonable and proper that the variations exist. The key question, however, is whether account has been taken of the non-technical arguments in a transparent way, and whether decision-makers and other stakeholders are aware of the full balance of arguments. It would seem that 'Risk Communication' to public and media has, and continues to be, performed in an illogical manner. Unfortunately, there does not always seem to be an appreciation that employing resources for risk reduction in one area, means that higher risks elsewhere will not be addressed (i.e. an "opportunity cost" issue).
One approach which may help to address the issue of transparency is the concept of a simple "Balance Sheet" to aid the final decision making process. The results of the best technical and economic appraisal of an investment option to reduce the risk of concern, (which should emphasise the uncertainties and thus the range of outcomes which might reasonably be considered) would be then subject to political and social 'broader' factors, which might strengthen or challenge the technical/economic appraisal. The important aspect of this approach is the separation of "objective" analysis and presentation of legitimate concerns in a clear and transparent way. Those (preferably Government) making the final decision will therefore have transparently available the main issues which might influence their decision and will have a clear duty to make clear the weight that they have attached to the various factors in determining the preferred outcome.
Putting it together -the key steps
Making decisions, whether by industry, regulators or government, is far from simple in this complex environment where so many issues need to be balanced and where "objective" science and economics indicates one thing, but often strongly held views based sometimes on a different set of values would lead to another. This paper argues for attempts to be made to try to reflect these different facets of decision-making by developing a systematic approach wherever possible. Going beyond the issue of controlling discharges from the nuclear industry (although it is an excellent example of the issues) we propose the following approach for debate and further development:
When potentially controversial regulatory decisions are required, which involve issues wider than science and economics, BNFL have advocated that:
• Decision-makers should do all that they can to present the facts in a balanced way. This needs to include the message that absolute safety cannot be achieved and that using scarce resources to address particular risks regardless of cost, will reduce the ability to address other potentially higher risks.
• Where there is a significant risk that outcomes might be uncertain, harmful and irreversible, the Precautionary Principle may need to be applied. However, this should be done within the over-riding requirement to achieve proportionality.
• Scientific and economic analysis should be fully considered in decision-making to the extent justified by the availability and reliability of data. Uncertainties should be recognized and taken into account.
• Reasonable steps should be taken to obtain the views and inputs of all relevant stakeholders, whilst recognising that decisions have to be made in a timely way to meet business and/or societal needs.
• When the results of quantitative assessment have been considered, a transparent process should be used to see how and why decisions might need to be mediated or changed by issues of perception or wider socio-political significance. The "balance sheet" approach for the transparent assessment of the impact of such issues on decision-making may provide a useful approach.
• Finally, for important decisions, "knock-on" effects and potential inconsistencies, going wider than one decision-making body, should be independently examined to limit disproportionate regulation.
Conclusions
The risks arising from exposure to radiation are relatively well understood technically. Very cautious approaches have been developed to achieve protection of the public from nuclear industry discharges, including concepts such as collective dose which are special to radiation. Greater clarity in the use of collective dose is proposed and the dangers of its uncritical use have been illustrated. One way of better using the collective dose concept is to assign contributions to dose bands and an example based on Sellafield has been presented.
Risks arising from the discharges of radioactivity have been reduced by several orders of magnitude over the last two decades even at controversial sites such as Sellafield and risks, even to the few most exposed people, are now at very low levels. However, there remain concerns and political pressures to spend very significant resources to reduce discharges further. On the basis of technical/economic arguments, to do so would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits achieved.
This disproportionate use of resources to reduce discharges of radioactivity is reflected in other aspects of the approach to reduce risks (although radioactivity is an extreme case). There is a very significant range of expenditure to prevent fatalities across various sectors from health to transport to power production. There does not appear to be coherence between methods of determining priorities used by regulators and others whose decisions commit resources for risk reduction. It is far from clear that the current apportionment of resources truly reflects public priorities.
It is however vital that public concerns are fully addressed and it is accepted that this might alter the outcome indicated by a technical/economic analysis of options. However, this should be achieved in an open and transparent way so that trade-offs between the factors influencing a decision are clearly visible, the consequences in terms of the use of resources to reduce risk are understood and stakeholders are aware of the reasons why decision makers have arrived at their final view.
